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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PERMISSIVE USE. The plaintiff had purchased the
disputed land and relied on the seller’s claim that the land
extended up to a fence; however, the plaintiff’s deed line
stopped some 200 feet from the fence.  The plaintiff used
the property to pasture livestock and built some sheds on
the property. The defendant’s predecessor in interest had
purchased the neighboring land from the same seller but the
buyer had a survey performed which showed that the
plaintiff’s fence was 200 feet onto the defendant’s property.
The buyer confronted the plaintiff about the problem with
no agreement, except that the buyer stated that the
plaintiff’s use was with the buyer’s permission. The court
held that the plaintiff had demonstrated sufficient hostile
possession and open use of the disputed land to support title
by adverse possession.  The court also held that the buyer’s
mere statement of permission was insufficient to make the
plaintiff’s use permissive. Rice v. Pritchard, 611 So.2d
869 (Miss. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[4].* The debtor
was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust established by the
will of the debtor’s father. The trust first provided for
income and principal to be distributed solely for the
debtor’s sister’s education with any remaining funds to be
distributed to the debtor at the trustee’s sole discretion. The
court held that the debtor’s interest in the trust was not
estate property because the trust was a spendthrift trust. In
re Esterson, 150 B.R. 72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
The debtor owned an interest in an employee award plan
under which the debtor received annual awards of stock in
the employer corporation. Each award was not vested until
five years after the award and then the award was only 50
percent vested with an additional 10 percent vesting for
each of the next five years. The debtor could receive the full
awarded amount upon death or retirement but could receive
only the vested amount if employment was terminated. The
debtor was employed at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
The court held that the debtor’s vested amount was estate
property.  The court recognized a problem with collecting
the additional vesting amounts over the life of the plan and
suggested that the trustee recover the current fair market
value of the right to receive the future vested amounts. In re
Carey, 150 B.R. 196 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[4].
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for a house with a fair market value of $95,000
and subject to a mortgage of $98,000. The debtors sought to
avoid an additional judgment lien of $50,000 as impairing
their exemption. The court held that the judgment lien was
void under Section 506 because the lien was totally
unsecured. The court distinguished the case from Dewsnup
v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), because the lien involved in
this case was not consensual as in Dewsnup. In re Cullen,
150 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993).
The debtors claimed joint homestead exemptions
totaling $15,000 on their residence. The residence had a fair
market value of $221,000 and was subject to consensual
mortgages totaling $291,000. The debtors sought to avoid
two additional judgment liens as impairing their
exemptions. The debtors’ plan included payment of the
mortgages. The court held that because the judgment liens
would impede the debtors’ fresh start and ability to retain
their home, the judgment liens could be avoided. Matter of
LaPointe, 150 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993).
RETIREMENT PLAN. The debtor had two Keogh
retirement plans for the debtor and the debtor’s employees;
however, the debtor failed to make any contributions for the
employees as required by ERISA. The court held that
because the plans were not ERISA qualified, the plans were
not subject to the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA and
were included in the bankruptcy estate. In re Lane, 149
B.R. 760 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1993).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2]. From November 1991 through
March 1992, the debtor had purchased agricultural
commodities from producers without fully paying for the
produce. In March 1992, a bank creditor offset the debtor’s
funds in a bank account against amounts owed to the bank.
The producers sought recovery of the offset funds because
the offset violated the PACA trust. The bank argued that
because it had no knowledge of the PACA trust, under
Restatement of Trusts § 284(1), the offset funds were no
longer subject to the PACA trust. The producers argued that
the existence of the PACA trust statute was sufficient notice
to remove the bank from bona fide receiver status under the
Restatement rule. The court held that in order for the setoff
funds not to be subject to the PACA trust, the creditor must
show that (1) it had no actual knowledge of the trust fund or
that the offset violated the trust fund provisions and (2) the
creditor gave consideration for the offset. In re H.R.
Hindle & Co., Inc., 149 B.R. 775 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   
DISMISSAL-ALM § 13.03[8][d]. The debtors
voluntarily dismissed their Chapter 12 case. The trustee was
in possession of funds received from the sale of cattle and
requested court permission to pay the taxes on the sales and
to pay trustee fees.  The FmHA, a creditor, filed an
objection to the trustee’s request and obtained from the
District Court an ex parte prejudgment writ of attachment of
the funds held by the trustee.  A U.S. Marshall took
possession of the funds under the attachment. Although
holding that the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction over
estate property after dismissal, the court held that because
the Bankruptcy Court serves under the District Court, the
Bankruptcy Court would not make any ruling in this case
and suggested that the trustee seek redress from the District
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Court. In re Ethington, 150 B.R. 48 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1993).
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8][c]. Prior to the debtor’s filing
for Chapter 12, a creditor obtained a foreclosure judgment
on a mortgage against the debtor’s farm land but no
foreclosure sale had yet occurred at the time of the filing.
The debtor’s plan included payment of the debt by
restructuring the debt over the life of the plan. The creditor
objected to the plan, arguing that the mortgage loan could
not be restructured because the loan was merged into the
foreclosure judgment, leaving no loan to be restructured.
The court distinguished this case from In re McKinney, 84
B.R. 748 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) where a foreclosure
judgment and sale had occurred prior to the bankruptcy
filing. The court held that because no sale had occurred, the
debtor retained ownership of the land subject to the
judgment lien which was an allowed secured claim.
Because allowed secured claims may be modified by a
Chapter 12 plan under Sections 1222(b)(2), (9), 1225(a)(5),
the plan could restructure the debt. In re Bland, 149 B.R.
977 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).
    CHAPTER 13   
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[5]. Two creditors objected to the
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan as not in the best interest of the
creditors because the plan did not include the debtor’s rural
homestead in the value of property which would be
distributed to creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The
debtor claimed the homestead as exempt and the creditors
had failed to object timely to the exemption. The creditors’
objection to the exemption was that the homestead was
partnership property which the debtor could not claim as an
exemption under state or federal law. The court held that the
exemption was allowed because the creditors did not timely
object to the exemption; therefore, the homestead was
excluded from the property which would be distributed in a
liquidation and the plan was confirmable. In re Alderman,
150 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
AVOIDABLE LIENS. Prior to the bankruptcy filing,
the IRS assessed, under I.R.C. § 6321, taxes for 1979
through 1983 and had filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
(NFTL) as to the assessments except for 1983. The debtor-
in-possession sought to avoid the liens as a bona fide
purchaser under Section 545(2) and I.R.C. § 6323(b). The
court held that the lien for which no NFTL was filed could
be avoided as to the debtor’s real and personal property.
The court also held that the tax lien for which an NFTL was
filed was avoidable as to the debtor’s money, bank
accounts, retirement accounts, stock and motor vehicle. In
re Znider, 150 B.R. 239 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed a timely claim for taxes, listing
each item as estimated. Over one year later and after the bar
date for claims, the IRS amended the claim, increasing the
amount of the claim by $300,000. The court denied the
increase in the claim because the IRS gave no reason for the
delay and the trustee and creditors had relied on the original
IRS claim in lengthy and expensive litigation which would
not have occurred if the amount of the original claim had
been closer to the amended claim. In re Tanaka Bros.
Farms, Inc., 150 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993).
JURISDICTION. The debtor was a corporation in
Chapter 7. The plaintiff was a former officer of the debtor
and had been assessed the I.R.C. § 6672 penalty as a
responsible person in a company which failed to pay
withholding taxes for its employees. The plaintiff sought a
judgment by the Bankruptcy Court as to liability for the
taxes. The court held that it had no jurisdiction over federal
tax issues involving a nondebtor where the nondebtor’s tax
liability would not affect the reorganization ability of the
debtor. In re Malone Properties, 150 B.R. 160 (Bankr.
S.D. Miss. 1993).
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[7]. At the confirmation hearing,
the IRS agreed to confirmation of the plan which included
the following provisions: (1) the debtors were to file income
tax returns for 1984-1986, (2) after the filings, the IRS had
90 days to file additional claims for those years, and (3)
after additional claims were filed, the debtors had 180 days
to file objections to the claims. The plan was confirmed and
the debtors filed their 1984-86 returns. The IRS filed a
claim for no tax due for 1984-86.  Two and one-half years
later, the IRS assessed the debtors $110,000 for 1984-86
and filed a Notice of Intent to Levy for the taxes plus
penalties and interest. The debtors sought an injunction
against the levy. The IRS argued that because the taxes
were nondischargeable, the confirmed plan was not binding
and that any injunction was prohibited by the Anti-
Injunction Act. The court held that the IRS was bound by its
agreement and the confirmed plan and that the IRS could be
enjoined from violating that agreement because the IRS had
voluntarily entered the agreement and a breach of the
agreement would interfere with the orderly administration
of the bankruptcy estate. In re Martin, 150 B.R. 43
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
POST-PETITION PENALTIES. The IRS had filed a
claim for pre-petition taxes, interest and penalties, including
penalties for failure to pay the taxes post-petition. The court
held that the IRS could not assess failure to pay penalties on
pre-petition taxes for the period during the Chapter 13 case.
In re Quick, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,166 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1993).
PRIORITY-ALM § 13.03[5]. The debtor provided no
creditor notice of the bankruptcy case to the IRS because
the debtor had no knowledge of an IRS claim. The IRS filed
a claim after the bar date for taxes and interest. The debtor
filed an objection to the claim. The IRS moved to have the
claim declared timely and allowed as a priority. The court
held (1) under Bank. Rule 3002(c), the claim was untimely
and ineligible for any exception, (2) the claim was allowed,
except to the extent the debtor’s objection was successful,
because no statutory provision denied allowance of a claim
for untimeliness, and (3) the IRS claim was entitled to the
priority provided by Section 726, subject to the equitable
subordination powers of the court under Section 510. In re
Rago, 149 B.R. 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
TAX LIENS. In January 1988, a creditor obtained a
prejudgment attachment against the debtor’s real property
and in August 1989, the creditor obtained a judgment
against the debtor. In November 1989, the IRS filed a
Notice of Tax Lien against all of the debtor’s property. In
December 1989, the creditor recorded the judgment against
the debtor.  Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-380a, the
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recording of a judgment against real property within four
months after the judgment perfected the lien as of the date
of attachment; thus, the creditor claimed that its lien was
considered perfected prior to the filing of the IRS tax lien.
Although the IRS recognized that Hartford Provision Co. v.
U.S., 579 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1978) held that a recording of a
judgment which caused a retroactive perfection of the
judgment lien was effective, the IRS argued that the case
applied only to judgments against personal property. The
court held that the holding in Hartford could not be
restricted only to personal property and held that the
creditor’s lien had priority. In re Anderson, 150 B.R. 86
(D. Conn. 1993).
CONTRACTS
FORUM CLAUSE. The plaintiff was a Massachusetts
company which sold Christmas trees grown by the
defendant in Washington. After the defendant visited the
plaintiff, the defendant sent a signed order to the plaintiff
for 1600 trees at a set price to be shipped by four trucks.
The contract stated that actions involving the contract could
be brought only in Washington. The plaintiff changed the
number of trees and the number of shipments, signed the
amended contract and returned the contract to the
defendant. The plaintiff later sent the required deposit. The
defendant sent the lower number of trees but the plaintiff
refused to make full payment because of the poor condition
of the trees. The plaintiff brought suit in Massachusetts for
breach of contract and the defendant moved to dismiss the
case for improper venue under the contract. The plaintiff
argued that the original contract was not effective because
the changes were only a counteroffer. The court held that
the contract was ratified by the plaintiff sending the deposit
and the defendant sending the ordered trees as per the
changes made by the plaintiff; therefore, the forum selection
clause was binding and the case was properly dismissed for
improper venue.  Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110 (1st
Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g]. The
debtors defaulted on a mortgaged loan from the defendant
FLB and the FLB commenced foreclosure proceedings in
May 1987. After delays required by several bankruptcy
filings, a hearing was held in February 1988 in which the
debtors argued that the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987
prevented the FLB from seeking foreclosure until the
debtors had been offered restructuring of the loan. The court
held that the debtor had no private right of action to enforce
the 1987 Act and that the 1987 Act did not automatically
bar a state foreclosure action. Speck v. Federal Land Bank
of Omaha, 494 N.W.2d 628 (S.D. 1993).
COTTON-ALM § 10.03[3]. The CCC has adopted as
final regulations amending the price support loan program
regulations for cotton, amending several administrative
provisions and eligibility requirements. 57 Fed. Reg. 40593
(Sept. 4, 1992).
GUARANTEED LOANS-ALM § 11.01[1][a]. The
FmHA has adopted as final amendments to the insured and
guaranteed soil and water loan regulations to conform the
regulations to FACT 1990. The amendments limit loan
purposes to soil and water conservation and protection,
permit the use of insured loans, and restrict the amount of
individual loans. 58 Fed. Reg. 15071 (March 19, 1993).
NATIONAL FORESTS-ALM § 11.04. The plaintiffs
sought judicial review of a Forest Service land and resource
management plan for the Ouachita National Forest. In
upholding the plan, the court held that the issuance of the
plan and a “vegetation management program pursuant to a
record of decision” as separate documents was allowed. The
court also held that the plan’s method of choosing
harvesting techniques site-by-site was allowed under 16
U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i). Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810
F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS-ALM § 10.03[3][b][i].
The plaintiffs had formed a farm partnership composed of
nine individuals and nine corporations. The partnership
submitted a 1988 Farm Operating Plan as part of an
application for participation in the 1988 price support and
adjustment program. Under the plan most partners would
contribute $13,000, but two partners contributed either part
management services and part cash or all management
services equal to $13,000.  The plan was approved by the
county committee which ruled that the partners all qualified
as separate “persons” for purposes of the $50,000 payment
limitation. Not included in the plan was a loan to the
partnership from one of the partners. The loan was repaid
during 1988 at a market rate of interest. At the end of the
crop year, the plan was reviewed by the county committee
which ruled that the partnership had violated its plan and
was only qualified as one person for payment limitation
purposes. The ruling was affirmed by DASCO which stated
three grounds for the determination: (1) the partnership
failed to meet the 30 percent capitalization requirement of
the ASCS handbook, (2) the loan from the partner violated
the financing requirements of the handbook, and (3) the two
partners who did not provide $13,000 in money did not
provide services commensurate with their claimed share of
the partnership proceeds. DASCO conceded the first issue
on appeal. The plaintiffs also argued that the county
determination was a final ruling not reviewable by DASCO
after the 15 day appeal limit had passed.  The court held that
county committee decisions are always reviewable. The
court also held that because DASCO made no finding that
the two partners did not make the contributions in money or
services as indicated by the operating plan, the second
ruling was improper. The court noted substantial evidence
that such contributions were made.  As to the loan made by
the partner to the partnership, the court held that the
regulations do not prohibit bona fide loans from partners to
partnerships and that only the handbook provides that such
loans disqualify the partner from being treated as a separate
“person.” Because the handbooks are not established by
notice and comment procedures under the Administrative
Procedures Act, the handbook provisions cannot be the sole
basis for the ruling. Therefore, because the loan was not
prohibited by the regulations, the partners could not be
denied separate “person” status on the basis of the loan. The
plaintiffs were granted summary judgment.  Jones v. Espy,
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Civ. Action No. 90-2831-LFO (D. D.C. 1993)(case
submitted by Alexander Pires, counsel for plaintiffs).
Editor’s note: The Digest welcomes submissions of rulings
involving agricultural law issues. The only compensation
we can offer is our thanks and acknowledgement.  Please
send a photocopy to Agricultural Law Digest, P.O. Box
5444, Madison, WI 53705.
PRICE SUPPORT LOANS-ALM 10.03[2]. The CCC
has issued interim rules amending the regulations for the
price support loan programs for grains and similarly
handled commodities. The amendments relate primarily to
administrative provisions and eligibility requirements. 58
Fed. Reg. 14495 (March 18, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6] .  The taxpayer had a married daughter who had a
son. The daughter died and the surviving spouse remarried
with the new spouse adopting the son. Under state law, the
adoption made the son no longer the child of the deceased
daughter. The IRS ruled that upon the death of the daughter,
under I.R.C. § 2612(c)(2), the daughter’s son was no longer
a skip person and the adoption did not change that result.
Ltr. Rul. 9310005, Dec. 7, 1992.
The taxpayers were husband and wife and executed
identical revocable trusts. The trusts provided that upon the
first death of a spouse, that decedent’s trust assets passed to
three trusts: a family trust, a QTIP trust and a reverse QTIP
trust. The family trust was to receive only property equal to
the decedent’s remaining unified credit, with the remaining
property passing to the QTIP trusts. The reverse QTIP trust
was to receive property equal in value to the decedent’s
GST exemption amount, with the regular QTIP trust
receiving the remaining property after the family trust and
the reverse QTIP trust. The trusts also provided that any
death taxes attributable to the QTIP trusts were to be paid
only from the regular QTIP trust. The IRS ruled that the
funding of the trusts would not effect the eligibility of the
trusts for QTIP or reverse QTIP treatment. The IRS also
ruled that the tax payment requirement did not affect the
effectiveness of the reverse QTIP trust to treat the first
decedent spouse as transferor of the trust property for GSTT
purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9310008, Dec. 9, 1992.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01. The decedent made several gifts by
checks dated, delivered and deposited in December 1985.
However, the checks were not paid by the drawee bank until
January 1986. The court held that the date of the gifts was
in 1985 under the relation back doctrine which applied in
this case because the checking account had sufficient funds
at all times to cover the checks and the checks were
unconditionally delivered to the donees who cashed the
checks within a reasonable period of time.  Est. of Metzger
v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No. 14 (1993).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3]. The
decedent’s will passed to the surviving spouse an interest in
trust in estate property.  The trust provided for at least
quarterly payments of all trust income and no person could
appoint the property to someone other than the surviving
spouse. The executor timely filed Form 706 but instead of
listing on Part 2 of Schedule M the surviving spouse’s
interest in the trust as property for which the QTIP election
was made, the executor listed the individual trust assets.
The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse’s interest in the
trust was eligible QTIP. The IRS also ruled that although
Part 2 was incorrectly filled out, the QTIP election was
effective because the executor included a copy of the will
and all of the trust assets. Ltr. Rul. 9310002, Nov. 5, 1992.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, executed identical
trusts. The trusts provided that upon the death of the first
spouse to die, the decedent’s share of marital property and
the decedent’s separate property passed to the surviving
spouse’s trust. The surviving spouse was to be a co-trustee
with an independent co-trustee. A protector, an unrelated
person, had the power to remove the non-family co-trustee
and the protector could be removed only with the consent of
all adult trust beneficiaries, except the surviving spouse.
The trust also provided several restrictions on distributions
to beneficiaries other than the surviving spouse. The IRS
ruled that the trust interest passing to a surviving spouse
would be QTIP. Ltr. Rul. 9310012, Dec. 12, 1992.
Under the decedent’s will, executed in 1968, certain
property passed to the surviving spouse unless the spouse
elected to take the statutory share of the decedent’s estate. If
such an election was made, the residuary of the decedent’s
estate passed to trusts for the decedent’s children with
remainders to the decedent’s grandchildren. The surviving
spouse elected to take the statutory share. Within nine
months after the decedent’s death, the children disclaimed a
portion of the residuary estate passing to them. The
decedent’s grandchildren, through guardians and court
orders, disclaimed a portion of the interests passing to them
because of the children’s disclaimers.  Under state law, the
grandchildren’s disclaimed interests passed to the surviving
spouse. The IRS ruled that the property passing to the
spouse under the statutory share and the various disclaimers
was eligible for the marital deduction, and because the
property all passed by intestacy and not the decedent’s will,
the marital deduction was not limited by the transition rules
of ERTA 1981. Ltr. Rul. 9310020, Dec. 14, 1992.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].The decedent signed a power of
attorney appointing a son as attorney-in-fact. The decedent
made many gifts and other estate planning transactions up
to the period of incompetency in March 1987. The son
made several gifts from the decedent’s property until the
decedent’s death in April 1987. In 1992, the state passed a
law authorizing attorneys-in-fact to make gifts in
accordance with the principal’s history of lifetime gifts. The
Court held that the state law applied retroactively and held
that the late transfers were not included in the decedent’s
gross estate as revocable transfers. Est. of Ridenour v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-41.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3]. A husband and wife established an
investment limited partnership in which the husband
contributed $990,000 in exchange for a 1 percent general
partnership interest and a 98 percent limited partnership
interest. The wife contributed $10,000 in exchange for a one
percent limited partnership interest. The general partner
controlled the timing of distributions but the partnership
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interests represented each partner’s share of partnership
profits and losses and rights in partnership property upon
dissolution. The husband transferred the 98 percent limited
partnership interest by gift to the wife. The IRS ruled that
the gift was eligible for the gift tax marital deduction. The
IRS also ruled that the limited partnership interest was not
included in the husband’s gross estate because the general
partner’s control over distributions was limited by state
fiduciary duty law. Ltr. Rul. 9310039, Dec. 16, 1992.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8. The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust with the spouse as beneficiary of all trust
income and corpus distributions.  The taxpayer transferred
the taxpayer’s one-half interest in a residence to the trust
and the trust provided that the spouse could live in the
residence or require the trustee, the taxpayer, to exchange
the property for another residence or for productive
property. The other one-half interest was transferred to a
revocable trust for the taxpayer. The spouse had a
testamentary special power of appointment over trust
property and could acquire trust property by purchase or
exchange of property with the same fair market value. If the
power of appointment was not exercised, the trust property
passed to the taxpayer in trust. The IRS ruled (1) the
spouse’s interest was QTIP for gift tax purposes; (2)
transfers of corpus from the trust to the spouse would not be
considered additional taxable gifts; (3) if the special power
of appointment was not exercised, the taxpayer would be
treated as the owner of the trust; (4) upon the death of the
spouse, the basis of trust property would be the value for
estate tax purposes; (5) a sale of the residence was eligible
for the nonrecognition of gain under I.R.C. § 121; (6) upon
the spouse’s death and non-exercise of the testamentary
special power of appointment, the interest in the trust
passing to the taxpayer was QTIP; and (7) if the spouse’s
estate does not make a QTIP election, the trust property will
not be included in the taxpayer’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 9309023,
Dec. 3, 1992.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a] . In 1987 a
conservator of the taxpayer formed two partnerships with
the conservator owning general and limited partnership
interests and the taxpayer owning limited partnership
interests.  One partnership owned farm land and the other
managed the land. The partnership agreements allocated the
partnership operating profits and capital profits among the
various partnership interests and provided compensation for
the general partners. In 1989 the partnership agreement was
amended to clarify that no gift was intended by the original
partnership agreement and to provide for contributions by
the conservator unless I.R.C. § 2036(c) was retroactively
repealed.  The taxpayer intended to transfer as a gift 49
percent of the taxpayer’s limited partnership interest in the
land partnership to the conservator and the conservator
planned to substitute a wholly owned corporation as the
general partners. The IRS ruled that the 1989 amendment
did not subject the partnership to I.R.C. § 2703 because the
amendments predated the effective date of the statute. The
intended gift transfer and planned substitution of the
corporation also did not subject the partnership to I.R.C. §
2703. Ltr. Rul. 9310003, Dec. 4, 1992.
The decedent and the decedent’s predeceased brother
had each been 50 percent shareholders in a private
corporation. The shareholders signed an agreement for the
corporation's purchase of a shareholder’s stock upon the
shareholder’s death. The agreement provided for the shares
to be valued at book value plus the proceeds of insurance
policies on the life of the shareholder in excess of the
policies’ cash value. The book value was based on annual
year-end audits. No evidence was presented that the buy-
sell agreement or its amendments were intended as
testamentary devices to escape estate tax. The court held
that the decedent’s estate’s use of the buy-sell agreement
value for the decedent’s stock was allowed because the
value accurately reflected the fair market value of the stock
and the agreement was entered into at arms-length and was
not intended to pass value in the corporation to the
decedent’s heirs without payment of estate tax. Rudolph v.
U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,130 (S.D. Ind.
1993).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7]. The taxpayer purchased
the entire stock of a corporation for $200,000 and
personally guaranteed corporate loans made after the stock
purchase. The total of the guaranteed loans exceeded $1
million but the debtor took only $30,000 in salary. The
court held that the taxpayer failed to provide sufficient
evidence that the dominant motive for the guaranty was the
protection of the taxpayer’s salary and not protection of the
investment in the company; therefore, the taxpayer was
entitled only to a personal bad debt deduction when the
taxpayer was required to pay on the guarantees. Garner v.
Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,167 (5th Cir.
1993), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-569.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03[2].  The taxpayer was
a tax exempt agricultural dairy cooperative.  In order to
bring its production up to capacity, the taxpayer purchased
milk from two other cooperatives, A and B. The taxpayer
purchased milk directly from cooperative A which passed
the proceeds back to its members under its cooperative
agreement. The taxpayer purchased milk directly from the
producer members of cooperative B but paid the proceeds to
cooperative B which passed the proceeds on to the members
under its cooperative agreement.  The value of the milk
purchased from A and B was less than the value of the milk
processed by the taxpayer from its own producer members.
Cooperatives A and B both sold only milk produced by its
members.  Citing Rev. Rul. 69-651, 1969-2 C.B. 135, the
IRS ruled that the purchase of milk from cooperative A did
not effect the taxpayer’s tax exempt status because the
taxpayer could “look through” cooperative A and treat the
milk as coming directly from producers.  Citing Rev. Rul.
55-496, 1955-2 C.B. 268, the IRS also ruled that the
purchases from cooperative B did not affect the taxpayer’s
tax exempt status because cooperative B acted only as an
agent of the producers.  Ltr. Rul. 9310028, Dec. 15, 1992.
The IRS has revised Rev. Rul. 72-602, 1972-2 C.B. 510
to remove the requirement that a cooperative must be doing
at least 50 percent in value of its business with members.
The IRS ruled that the factors in Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.
v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 305 (1965), acq., 1966-1 C.B. 3 would
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be used in conjunction with all the facts and circumstances
in determining whether a cooperative was doing business on
a cooperative basis. Rev. Rul. 93-21, I.R.B. 1993-13, 5.
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES-ALM § 7.02[4]. The IRS
has issued a revision of Rev. Proc. 92-17, 1992-1 C.B. 679,
providing rules for substantiation of employee lodging,
meal and incidental expenses incurred while traveling away
from home. The revision also includes an optional method
for employees and self-employed persons in computing the
deductible costs of business meal and incidental expenses
incurred while traveling away from home.  Rev. Proc. 93-
21, I.R.B. 1993-13.
ENERGY CREDIT. The taxpayer installed a kaolin
pipeline to transport kaolin from the mining site to the
processing plant instead of using gas powered trucks. The
court held that, although the pipeline saved considerable
fuel, the energy tax credit was not available for substitution
of one type of property for the less fuel efficient property.
J.M. Huber Corp. v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,169 (Fed. Cl. 1993).
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period April 1, 1993 through June 30, 1993, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 6 percent and for
underpayments remains at 7 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations remains at 9 percent.
Rev. Rul. 93-24, I.R.B. 1993-14.
REFUND. The taxpayers claimed a share of partnership
depreciation on their 1982 individual income tax return and
reported gain from the sale of the partnership interest on
their 1983 return. The taxpayers signed an extension of the
period of limitation on assessments for their 1982 return and
in 1989, the taxpayers were assessed additional taxes
resulting from disallowance of some of the depreciation. In
1989, the taxpayers filed for a refund for 1983 based on less
recognized gain resulting from an increase in the basis of
the partnership interest due to the disallowance of the
depreciation.  Because the refund claim was untimely, the
taxpayers sought the refund under the doctrine of equitable
recoupment. The IRS ruled that the doctrine of equitable
recoupment was not available to the taxpayers because the
transactions involved were separate events occurring in
different tax years. Ltr. Rul. 9311002, Oct. 28, 1992.
RETURN. The IRS has announced that Publication 917
“Business Use of a Car” on pages 6 and 7 uses the wrong
figure in a sample calculation of depreciation and should
start with the total cost and not the lesser business cost
figure. Ann 93-48, I.R.B. 1993-12, 21.
The IRS has announced an error in IRS Pub. 534
“Depreciation” in that the percentages in the table on page
18 for the mid-quarter convention are in reverse order. Ann.
93-50, I.R.B. 1993-13, 18.
S CORPORATIONS- ALM § 7.02[3][c].
TRUSTS. The grantor established a trust which, upon
the grantor’s death, created a trust for the grantor’s
surviving spouse. Upon the death of the surviving spouse,
the trust created separate trusts for the grantor’s living lineal
descendants, funded with S corporation stock. The separate
trusts provided (1) at least quarterly distribution of all trust
income; (2) distribution of corpus for the beneficiary’s
maintenance, support, health and education; (3) termination
of the trust when a beneficiary reached age 22; and (4)
passing of any remainder at the death of a beneficiary to the
creditors of the beneficiary’s estate, the beneficiary’s
surviving spouse and any lineal descendants. The IRS ruled
that the separate trusts were QSST’s. Ltr. Rul. 9311020,
Dec. 18, 1992.
The decedent’s predeceased spouse’s will established a
trust which held S corporation stock and qualified as a
QSST. The trust provided that the trust was to terminate as
soon as possible after the death of the decedent. The entire
trust corpus was included in the decedent’s gross estate and
the decedent’s estate elected to pay the estate tax by
installments and sought a ruling that the trust would qualify
as a QSST during the period of the administration of the
estate during the years the estate tax was paid in
installments. The IRS ruled that, under I.R.C. §
1361(c)(2)(A)(ii), the trust would qualify as a QSST only
for two years after the death of the decedent. Ltr. Rul.
9311025, Dec. 18, 1992.
TAX LIENS. A creditor of the debtor obtained a
judgment lien against the debtor’s property, including after-
acquired property. After that lien was perfected, the IRS
filed a tax lien against the debtor’s property, including after-
acquired property. Subsequent to both liens, the debtor
acquired additional property. The court held that although
both liens became perfected at the same time as to the after-
acquired property, the federal lien had priority because
I.R.C. § 6323 provided that tax liens had priority over liens
which became perfected after the filing of the tax lien.
Because the judgment lien did not become perfected until
after the tax lien was filed, the tax lien had priority. U.S. v.
McDermott, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,164 (S.Ct.
1993), rev’g, 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991).
LANDOWNER’S LIABILITY
INVITEES-ALM § 1.02[1]. The plaintiff had paid the
defendant $1 to fish in a pond on the defendant's property.
While fishing, the plaintiff became bothered by fire ants on
the property and after three hours of fishing and being
bothered by the ants, fell and was injured while attempting
to shake off some of the ants. The court held that the
plaintiff was an invitee and the defendant was not liable for
the injury because the plaintiff had knowledge of the fire
ants for some time before becoming injured. Fleming v.
Arrington, 610 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Matter of Toti, 149 B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993), rev’g,
141 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (discharge) see p.
49 supra.
U.S. v. Hill, 113 S.Ct. 941 (1993), rev’g, 945 F.2d 1529
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (alternative minimum tax) see p. 32 supra.
McMurray v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1993),
rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-27 (charitable deduction) see p. 51
supra.
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MORTGAGES
ASSIGNMENT OF RENT. The plaintiff purchased
farm land from the defendant by installment note. The note
was secured by a purchase money mortgage (trust deed)
and the parties executed an assignment of rents which
included language that the assignment was intended as
additional security for the note. The plaintiff rented the
farm on a crop share basis to third parties. In October 1985,
after the plaintiff defaulted on the note, the plaintiff
received the proceeds of the sale of the plaintiff’s share of
the crop produced by the tenant. The defendant began
foreclosure proceedings in January 1986 and a receiver was
appointed in March 1986. The defendant claimed that the
rent proceeds were subject to the assignment of rent
agreement as a separate document which required no action
by the defendant after the default of the plaintiff. The court
held that because the note, mortgage and assignment
agreement were executed at the same time as part of the
same transaction, the documents were to be read together
with the assignment of rents agreement functioning solely
as additional security.  Therefore, the defendant’s right to
the rents depended upon the procedures in the mortgage and
did not arise until foreclosure was begun and a receiver
appointed. The rent proceeds were held not subject to the
assignment of rents agreement. Lake County Trust Co. v.
Two Bar B, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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